000

for other aims.

Accomplices (sirek) of a crime are subjected to punishment, usually in equal amount, although differences are allowed according to the extent of blame (Kunakbai). The plaintiff can, however, in the absence of the accomplices of the crime, exact a penalty from the person present, obligating himself not to make any further suit (the biis' books of the Perovsk uyezd). (2)

672

2. It has now come into custom in the Perovsk uyezd to revenge oneself on one's personal enemies in the following fashion. If strong evidence exists against the defendant, the plaintiff names one of his personal enemies as an accomplice of the defendant, causing him unpleasantness and trouble about his oath.

[578]

For the ringleaders (bashi or urybasy (3), i.e., those who first

3. According to bii Sultan, the word dzhortuulbasy, head of a gang, has not been used since the time the wars (yaugerchilik) stopped.

began to carry out the idea, punishment is not increased. (4)

4. It is said that the person who first committed robbery, giving rise to a long baranta, pays toguzy, while the others, who are guilty of taking strange property are sentenced to muynyna kosak kutine terkeu (cf. Chapter XII).1/n

According to another opinion, the ringleader is usually called into court. He pays the entire penalty, and can then /145/ split it up among his accomplices. Now they interrogate the ringleader who is called into court about his accomplices as well, in order to call in all of them. If they do not find all of them, they penalize those who are found, requiring them to split it up with the rest and recording this obligation into the report of the judgment. The distribution of the fine among the defendants is left to them. If they cannot come to an agreement, the bii apportions the payment of the value of what has been stolen, in accordance with how much each person took for himself, and the fine is divided equally.

1/n [Cf cat. 116, pp. 200-207 -- A.]

[145 cont.]

175 721 Turkestan at the beginning of the 17th century, and this city was always the residence of their khans. The year in which this conquest took place and the leader of the campaign are unknown. We could not even discover where Khan Murtaza, Kuchum's father, lived, nor whether his descendants reigned over the Kirghiz [-Kazaks] for a long period. Nor did we have any more success in our research concerning Khan Ak-Nazar, who attacked the uluses of the Nogais in 1569, when Semen Maltsov, the envoy of Tsar Ivan the Terrible was there (2). We have gathered

2. See above, p. 140.

some definite evidence, however, that Ishim khan of the Kirghiz-Kazaks, held Turkestan around 1630.

175 [114] Abulgazi Baiadur is the first to speak of it, and it is referred to for the second time in the Annals of Siberia. We have found still more information about it in the archives of the Border Commission in Orenburg, in the file for 1748.

Abulgazi Baiadur made the acquaintance of the Kirghiz-Kazaks and Khan Ishim about the year 1630 (3), because at this

3. Histoire Généalogique des Tatars, /Leiden, 1726/, Pt. IX, Chapter XI.

time he was forced by his brother Isfandiar, khan of Urgendzhi, to flee his homeland, and he withdrew to Turkestan, where Khan Ishim [146] received him and protected him for three months. After that he escorted him to Tashkent and placed him under the protection of Tursun, khan of that country. Two years later these two princes fell into disagreement. Ishim killed Tursun and seized Tashkent, and Abulgazi withdrew into the realm of Bukhara.

[662 578]

175 721 Ishim Khan is known in the Siberian chronicles for his disagreements and his wars, and particularly for the wars of his son Djangir, or Iangir, with the kungtaidii of the Dzungars, Batur, or Bagatyr (1). Fisher says that Bagatyr opened war on

1. Fisher, Sibirskaia Istoriia..., Bk. IV, Pt. 3, paragraph 13.

[150 cont.]

175 replied by [151] promising to be obedient to Russia in all things.
643 These relations had no sequel, however, for Prince Gagarin was
[662] recalled to Moscow shortly after, and Tiavka, the oldest and most cautious of the khans, died. His companions did not know enough to profit from this favorable situation. Instead of joining together again to ask Russia's protection against the Dzungars, they
[578] began to quarrel among themselves, and without any thought of the general welfare they continued in their usual calling, that is, they pillaged all their neighbors. And Russia, who had offered them help and protection, was not the last to suffer from
[726] this. Not content with their frequent raids across the borders of Siberia, in that same year, 1717, they moved in as far as Novo-Sheshminsk (in the Kazan guberniya), took the city, and laid it waste, and although they were driven out with great losses, they
[727] took away a large number of prisoners. This last expedition was made by the subjects of Khan Abulkhair (1). Kaip was afraid

1. See Rychkov's History of Orenburg /Istoriia Orenburgskaia/ and governor
[643] Nepluev's reports to the senate. Rychkov does not say who commanded the Kazaks in this expedition, but Nepluev says that it was Khan Abulkhair, who later became a subject of the Russian empire.

that it might be attributed to him and that he might be punished, although innocent, for the crime of his rival, so he sent a letter
[728] in 1718 to Peter I, in which he offered perpetual peace and alliance (2).

2. This letter, as well as the reply made to it by the governor of Kazan, is still preserved today /1832/ in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

175 This letter, however, did not stop the just vengeance of
721 the dwellers along the border, who were annoyed by the constant
726

[168 cont.]

[448] several gentlemen from Ufa, several faithful Bashkirs, and some Russian Cossacks. Also two geodetic officers were charged with making a map of the country occupied by the Kazaks.

[169] Tevkelev's arrival at the horde revealed all of Abulkhair's ambitious scheming. The officers charged with receiving the oath from the new subjects not only were not received in conformity with their rank, but were in danger of death scarcely after they had arrived. The Kazaks were incensed at the very thought of losing their rude freedom and revolted spontaneously when they saw the Russians among them, wishing to sacrifice Tevkelev instantly to their anger. The Khan saved him but could not quiet the uprising. His more daring subjects even attacked him and asked him by what right he had opened relations with foreign powers without the consent of the people, promising his obedience as well as that of the hordes. One would naturally expect a violent opposition of this kind upon learning that Abulkhair had had difficulty in obtaining the consent of a small number of Kazaks to send his deputies into Russia. This bold trick could even have cost him his life, and if at that time he did not fall under the blows of his angered compatriots, he owed his salvation more to luck than to his power, for we shall soon see how limited it was.

[576]

Tevkelev himself, whose life was threatened by the Kazaks several times, owed his survival less to the protection of the Khan than to his profession of the Moslem faith, and above all to his eloquence, by means of which he disarmed those who had come to take his life several times. The story of these events is preserved in the archives.

[534] In his report of them in his History of Orenburg, Rychkov says that the power and captivation of Tevkelev's speech caused him to be regarded by the Kazaks as an extraordinary man. We will add that he owed his success partly to Batyr Taimas, a Bashkir elder who was then with him and who had made himself known among the Kazak hordes through his exploits and his valor.

Tevkelev's pains and troubles were not useless. No matter how strong the resistance of the people with whom he had [170] to deal was, too much effort finally tired them, and

[224 cont.]

×648 [661] With this in mind he was granted several favors, including the fact that his youngest son, aged three, was accepted as hostage in place of his eldest, Sultan Pirali.

[661] To this same end there was a return to the thought expressed by Empress Anna in her ukase to Kirilov, dated February 11, 1736, an idea which was in accord with what we mentioned earlier concerning Abulkhair's wish, to build a city at the mouth of the Syr Darya and to begin its population with criminals condemned to exile. But all these projects were unsuccessful.

×648 578 The hatred of the Khans Abulkhair and Kaip, which had been known since the beginning of the 17th century, was not extinguished by their death, but was left as a heritage to their children and their children's children. We shall see in the course of this work that it has not only not been entirely eliminated today, but even has not weakened among the principal descendants of these two chiefs. But before speaking of these contemporaries, we shall describe the history of their ancestors. The constancy with which these two families have hated each other and pursued each other for a hundred years merits special attention. This hatred may go back even farther, perhaps, for we do not know what sentiments existed between Abulkhair's father and Kaip's father.

×648 We have already said that Sultan Batyr, son of Kaip, and his son, the khan of Khiva, had sent ambassadors to Orenburg for the first time in 1650/1750/. Although their proposals were not accepted, being prejudicial to Khan Nurali, who was recognized by Russia, nevertheless the arrival of Batyr's envoys and their intentions of allying themselves with the Russians gave birth to suspicions in Nurali's heart and reignited his hereditary hatred for Batyr. Furthermore he could not view with composure the fact that in spite of the refusal of the [225] Russian government to send all the caravans in general across Batyr's pasture lands, Shah-Niyaz, the khan of Khiva, had forbidden his subjects to go from Khiva to Orenburg and to return by a route other than that of the lands of his father. This measure diminished Nurali's influence over trade and the revenues which he took in, like all the Kazak khans, based on the notion of a right over merchandise passing through their steppes.

[643 661 651]

[228 cont.]
X648 became unnecessary (2) because by then the Dzungars, the most

2. Ukase of the Senate of October 24, 1756.

terrible enemies of the Kazaks, had been almost destroyed. These were those same Dzungars who, under the reign of their kungtaidjis, Batur and Galdan Tsyren, had not only been seen to spread terror through the weak principalities of Central Asia, but also to arouse justifiable alarm in the emperors of Russia and China.

With an astonishing speed this people passed from the zenith of its power to absolute ruin. In 1745 under the commands of Galdan Tsyren it was still able to cause an important revolution in all of Central Asia. Under Galdan's sons, whose genius did not approach that of their father, this people imperceptibly lost all its energy, but its neighbors continued to fear it. In 1756 it had already been vanquished and dispersed, and so many had been annihilated that its lands became almost completely deserted.

X648 578 669 The principal causes of the fall of the Dzungarian empire were, as is known, the discord which took place among its last chiefs and the civil wars provoked by Amursan's ambition, which caused the ruin of the entire nation. Having quarreled with Davatsi, who disputed his authority, in 1754 he acknowledged himself a subject of China and begged this empire for auxiliary troops against Davatsi. Emperor Ch'ien Lung received him most graciously and [229] gave him a large army, which was given secret orders to accompany him not to assure him supreme power but to overthrow the Dzungars, who had so often disquieted the Chinese government. The intentions of the Emperor were realized, and in 1756 the ravaged lands of Dzungaria were annexed to China (1).

1. See the extracts from the Chinese work entitled Hsi Yu Wen Chien Lu, in /E.F./ Timkovskii's Journey to China [Puteshestvie v Kitai chrez Mongoliiu v 1820 i 21 gg. (Journey to China through Mongolia in 1820 and 1821)], Vol. I, p. 155.

[234 cont.]
X 648 government took notice of it and gave orders, by way of reward (1),

1. By an ukase of August 25, 1755, the Khan was given a letter patent on this subject.

to begin to give Nurali the stipend which he had been assigned five years before and which had been withheld because he had not delivered the Russian prisoners. Later, as a favor, he was also granted permission to send kinsmen or the most distinguished of the sultans or elders to the court every two or three years. [431 661] These trips entailed, on the one hand, advantages and gifts to the Khan and his deputies, and on the other hand, they were useful to the government. During their stay at court, the envoys could serve as hostages, and as they became acquainted with the laws, customs, and habits of Russia during this sojourn, it was possible that they might become accustomed to it and spread information within the horde about the Europeans.

[721 726] The hatred and mutual hostility between the Bashkirs and the Kazaks saved many Russians from certain destruction by preventing their alliance. However this did not assure [235] peace on the border. The Bashkirs were burning with a desire for vengeance, and in spite of being forbidden to cross the Ural, they never ceased to raid the pastures of their enemies and to ruin them. Likewise the Kazaks never stopped pursuing and punishing these fiery enemies to the very center of their land. Once they had entered this region across the border, they fought the guards and pillaged the Russian settlements on their return, and these events were frequent. Although the Khan and sultans had good Y 648 intentions, they could not calm their subjects. They frankly 578 admitted their lack of power and wrote that the common people even suspected them of maintaining secret liaisons with the Orenburg authorities in order to subject all the hordes to Russia (1).

1. Sultan Aichuvak in his zeal for Russia wrote to Nepluev as early as 1754 that the ordinary Kazaks suspected him and the

[235 cont.]

Khan of having secret relations with the Orenburg authorities. As a result, in order not to confirm the opinions of his subjects on this idea, he asked that when he was sent reprimands for them in letters coming from Orenburg, they be sent for him also. Concerning known brigands, he said he could make them known in secret but could not deliver them, leaving the power of sending troops against them to the Russian government.

As a result the government resolved to increase Nurali's power, and at the same time to devise a plan for punishing the Kazaks in such a way that they would feel at least once the power and the force of the empire. An order had already been given to draw a detailed map of the western part of the Kazak steppe, and the best means were already being sought for carrying on a campaign beyond the Ural. Everything foretold a terrible calamity for the Little Horde (2), when the Seven Years War opened between

2. See the ukase of June 10, 1756.

Russia and Prussia, and it was averted.

Nevertheless there was a great national assembly in the Little Horde in 1756, no doubt with the aim of discussing ways of averting the danger menacing them, and it opposed not only the demand of the Khan and his brothers to return the Russian prisoners and the Bashkir deserters, [236] but also undertook to help them. The Sultans Erali and Aichuvak pursued the interests of Russia with great warmth on this occasion.

At the beginning of 1757, Dunduk Dashi, deputy of the khan of the Volga Kalmuks, warned the governor of Astrakhan that all the Kazaks were intending to enter the Turkish possessions on the Kuban and that they had already requested permission from the Ottoman Porte through an embassy sent for this purpose. This news was difficult to believe. Nevertheless prudence demanded

[249 cont.]
father's aims. It was only necessary to know whether the creation of a deputy of the khan would not make the Kazaks discontented and whether they might not refuse to recognize their future chief. It was also necessary to know what [250] Ishim's personal inclinations toward Russia were and whether this novelty might not lead to some unpleasant consequences for her. It was ordered that research be made at the horde itself on all these points and that the results be sent to Petersburg. The authorities in Orenburg replied that according to the custom of the Kazaks, the position of khan should pass to one of his brothers after the death of Nurali and not to one of his sons. The Minister answered that the law of succession in private life could not be applied to succession to the title of khan, because this title always passed from one man to another by the choice of the people. Nevertheless it was decided, in order to avoid grumbling and dissension, to induce the Kazaks to choose Sultan Ishim themselves as the deputy of the khan and to confirm the choice of the people afterwards.

While studies were being made on this subject and the correspondence continued, the year 1771 arrived and the desertion of the Kalmuks caused the Kazaks matters to be forgotten, not only by the government but by the Kazaks themselves, as we will see later. This is why Khan Nurali's plan to elevate his son to the post of his deputy remained unfulfilled.

He could have attained his end if the death of his son, who arrived in Orenburg in 1769 where he was held as hostage, had not grieved him sorely and had not driven him into a stubbornness which was forgivable for a father but unpleasant for the Russian government. It was the second son he had lost in Orenburg, and both had died as children. Attributing their deaths to lack of care, he did not wish under any circumstances to give up another child of his own as hostage. And he himself refused to come to Orenburg, although he was invited to come several times by the authorities for conferences. Certain quarrels which arose between him and his brothers increased his troubles. The envy caused by the marks of attention given them by the Russian government, by using them more than it did him in its relations with the Little

K [250 cont.]
K 648 Horde, and with greater success, and finally the vexation of his
[52 [251] own weakness, all troubled him and removed his power to
578 act with coolness. Having aroused his arrogance, the court of
K Petersburg rejected the thought it had had of increasing his power
[66] over the Kazaks, a measure which had once been thought indis-
pensable. Thus Nurali came to the point where he began to be
given less consideration. In spite of his brothers' quarrels with
him, they were sent sabers as a reward for their zeal, and his
request for stipends fixed by the year were put aside. He was
even refused permission to send deputies to Petersburg. It was
directed to pay no attention to his obstinacy on the matter of the
hostage and to say to him always that Russia would know how to
maintain the Kazaks in obedience without that (1). The same

1. Ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of March 16, 1770.

thing was written that year to Sultan Ablai, who, in the hopes
of receiving several advantages and privileges from Russia,
offered to give up one of his sons as hostage, but later, after he
saw that most of his demands could not be satisfied, he refused
on fantastic pretexts to carry out what he himself had proposed.
K The renewal of the raids on the Orenburg border by the
[721] Little Horde in 1770 was about to bring still another punishment (2)

2. Reinsdorf, the governor of Orenburg, received on January 10, 1771 an order from the Empress to send troops into the Kazak steppe in order to punish the bandits and free the prisoners.

x K
648
167 upon them by the Russian govern ent, which they were fortunate
enough to avoid only because of the desertion of the Volga Kalmuks,
EK
KO
648
167 which gave affairs a new turn. This change gave a new destina-
tion to the Russian troops, who had been enemies of the Kazaks
and now became their allies. We will now give the history of

[279 cont.]

×648 After this beginning Baron Igelstrom, who felt, on the basis of Syrym's assurances, that the establishment of peace in the Little Horde was inevitable, [280] prepared to build cities, mosques, caravansaries, and schools in the middle of the steppes. [177] He reported this to the Empress and planned to comply in everything with the organization of the provinces of the interior and to the regulations published in Russia on public education.

[181] This gratifying and consoling hope did not last long. By the following year, 1788, it was beginning to weaken, and soon it disappeared completely. The people, who had long been [662] accustomed to excitement and brigandage, tired of their in- [578] activity and once more began their old disputes, driven from 643 one side by Nurali's kinsmen, from another by Kaip, and from a third by Batyr Syrym. The followers of the latter were the most numerous and the most active. The sultans could have no power over them, as they were no longer respected. The elders [692] chosen to supervise the conduct of the people, as well as the heads of the tribunals, had no authority and dared not give commands, and followed the stream which carried them along.

[721 662] These internal circumstances were joined by others which acted from outside. The Turks, then at war with Russia, sought to incite the Bukharans against the Russians. The Bukharans aroused the Little Horde, and it was to this end that they suggested to Erali, at first, that they help him take back Khan Nurali by force. Later they entered into relations with Syrym and sent him ×648 and those of his line an appeal couched in these terms:

721 771 186 662 "To the brave warriors, beys, and elders, Sarytai bey, Syrym Batyr, Shukurali bey, Sadyrbek, Barak Batyr, Dajdan Batyr, peace and blessing. And now our words. Glory to the most high God! By His holy grace, all our affairs are running smoothly. We have but one sorrow. Not long ago an ambassador came to us from the Turkish sovereign, vicar of God, with a letter informing us that the infidel Russians have assembled from all sides and, in alliance with the seven Christian states, have started to march. [281] Since you live closer to the Russians than we do and, consequently, know better how to fight them, we propose

X 648 [282 cont.]

[721 771 186 662] "In closing, we are respectfully, in the year of the Hegira 1202 (1788 after the birth of Jesus Christ)."

To this letter was affixed the black seal of the atalyk of Bukhara (first minister of Shah Murat).

[721 662] Syrym, in spite of his ties with the Orenburg authorities, replied to the atalyk that he himself and his followers were ready to obey the commandments of God, but that they could not begin the war until the Bukharans and the other Asiatic peoples had entered Russia.

This step came to the knowledge of the Russian government, and Syrym began to be suspected and his duplicity discovered, and all confidence in him was lost. On his part, he did not wish to suffer humiliation, and although he still seemed devoted for a certain time, at the same time he no longer seemed so disposed to agree with the views of the Orenburg government. Meanwhile his followers were again pillaging Russia [721 578] as before. The raids on the borders increased daily. The disputes became much stronger in the horde. While the sultans and part of the people demanded a khan, the elders charged with supervising the conduct of the people, as well as the members of the tribunals, did not carry out anything, never met, did not look into matters, did not come to Orenburg except to collect their stipends, and had no influence over the horde.

[643] In this state of affairs there was no longer anything else to do but to return to the old administration and to re-establish the position of khan. An auspicious pretext was offered for this re-establishment when Nurali, at his death, commanded, among his last wishes to his children, that they remain faithful to Russia.

[283] The Russian government's sole desire to designate a new khan for the Little Horde was a bolt of lightning to Syrym and stripped off the mask with which he had covered himself. When he saw his most cherished hopes destroyed and had lost all his importance, he no longer had the will or the need to restrain himself. For this reason he returned to his early pursuits and once more openly began to act as a brigand.

[290 cont.]
for some time to observe their conduct. His supervision soon became useless, because the nomads did not wish to have a council, did not turn to it in their affairs, and asked for a khan.

In order to comply with their wishes, that same year it was ordered to proceed with the election of a successor to Ishim. Most of the horde wanted to elect Sultan Karatai, son of Nurali, but his devotion to Russia was doubtful. Sultan Aichuvak, son of Abulkhair and uncle of Karatai, who had presided over the council, inspired much more confidence in the government and had much more right to this honor. In October, 1797 the Kazaks assembled near the [291] border proclaimed him, and the following year Emperor Paul confirmed him, as the chief of the entire Little Horde. The council which had been formed to govern the Little Horde after Ishim's death was ordered to remain constantly by Khan Aichuvak and was called the council of the khan.

It can be seen by the Orenburg archives that Aichuvak had often distinguished himself, not only by his attachment to Russia but also by his influence over the Kazaks while they were ruled by Nurali. Thus his elevation to the rank of khan seemed to promise various advantages. However, what followed did not justify this hope. Being burdened with age, the Khan could not act as he had earlier and was nothing more than a very weak leader. The internal disputes, the Buruts, the pillaging of caravans, the raids on the Russian frontier, especially against the Bashkirs, the acts of vengeance which were taken after these, the investigations and the punishments caused a terrible confusion in the Little Horde. The commissions formed of deputies from the different peoples, which we described above, could not act, and it was decided to dissolve them. The Khan did not have enough power to punish the guilty or to protect the oppressed. The disorder and anarchy which had more or less always prevailed among the Kazaks increased from one day to the next, and finally the dissensions spread everywhere.

These circumstances produced very important consequences. Many of the Kazaks who were nomadizing near the Ural River withdrew to the far end of the steppes and refused to obey the descendants of Abulkhair. Some of them fused with several

[296 cont.]

[648] studs, to avenge themselves for the thefts and offenses committed [727] against them by the Bashkirs. Finally, this group decided to withdraw into the depths of their steppes and did not agree to come near the Russian borders except on the invitation of General Viazmitinov, the commander in chief of the Orenburg region.

[692] In 1798 it was ordered that a tribunal be established, after the example of the Little Horde and on the request of Khan Vali, in the fort of Petropavlovsk, for the judgment of suits and disputes between the Kazaks of the Middle Horde and the residents along the Siberian border. This tribunal, made up of deputies of these two peoples, was organized in 1800, but the Kazak members let several years pass without appearing, so that it was not opened until 1806.

Here we end the detailed description of the Kazak hordes. [114] Having shown everything which took place among these peoples until the end of the 18th century, we will not speak of the events of the 19th century. The time which has passed since its beginning is still too close to us, and the judgments we could bring to this period would seem either partial, or misplaced, or doubtful.

We consider it necessary, however, to mark the transition between the past and the present by indicating briefly the order of succession of the khans of the Middle Horde and the Little Horde of the Kazaks.

[643] [578] Vali, who succeeded his father in 1781, reigned until his death, which came in 1818. However in his last years he was not the sole khan of the Middle Horde, for because of [297] his quarrels with several tribal chiefs and at the request of several Kazaks, in 1816 Emperor Alexander designated a second khan for this horde, who was Bukei, son of Barak, and who died in 1818.

[631] With him the title of khan died out in the Middle Horde. Today it is divided into districts and governed by a special regulation which we will enter at the end of this work. [This section not translated.]

not translated.]

[43] Aichuvak ruled the Little Horde until 1805 and then abdicated of his own accord because of old age and illness.

His successor was his son Djantiura, who was assassinated by his cousins, the sons of Khan Nurali, and their accomplices.

[297 cont.]

[648] [643] After his death the Little Horde was without a khan for more than two years. In 1812 his brother Shirgazy, who is still alive [1832], was elevated to that position, but he no longer rules the horde, because it too has been divided by the government into [631] three districts, whose chiefs are independent of the khan.

[643] At the same time as the elevation of Shirgazy, that is, in 1812, Sultan Bukei, son of Nurali, was appointed the khan of the Kazaks who had come with him from the left bank of the Ural into the government of Astrakhan and had since then been given the name of the Bukei Horde.

Bukei died in 1815, leaving several sons, of whom the eldest, Dhangir, was appointed khan in 1824. He is still governing the Kazaks who live in the government of Astrakhan.

This is the end of the list of the Kazak khans who have been recognized and confirmed by the Russian government. We do not include among them Barak, or Batyr, or Kaip, or his son Abulgazy, for, as we have said previously, they were not elected except by a small number of their partisans. The last, in spite of his title, was according to eyewitnesses (1), almost reduced

1. See the memoirs of Dr. Bolshoi, who was taken prisoner by the Kazaks in 1803.

[298] to a state of mendicancy. His power and influence over the people was so weak after Batyr Syrym, that we would not even have mentioned him if he himself, his brothers and his children, among whom Sultan Arungazi must be particularly distinguished, did not continue to stand out for their hereditary hatred of Abulkhair's descent
● 578 line. We have followed the constant progress of this mutual hatred between the two families for a whole century. Our readers know that it already existed between Abulkhair and Kaip at the beginning of the last century.

It passed from them to their children, and [illegible]-children, and great-grandchildren, among whom it still continues today and who will carefully transmit it to their descendants, perhaps for another century or even more.

[298 cont.]

578 Kaip's principal descendants are indicated in the genealogical chart which we have made for them, as are the descendants of Abulkhair, as a complement to Tevkelev's charts to which we referred at the appropriate time.

[299]

Part III. Statistical Information on the Kirghiz-Kazaks

Chapter I. Population

101 When one speaks of a little known people, the first questions which seem proper to ask are usually as to what country they inhabit and what their population is.

The answer to the first is found here in the description which we give of the area occupied by the Kazaks, whose borders we also 161 indicate [in untranslated section]. The solution of the second seems impossible to us. 'If many of the civilized countries of Europe cannot know the exact number of their inhabitants, how can it be attained when it is a matter of half-savage nomads, who have no principle of administration, who are constantly moving from one place to another, and with whom the simple words of counting the people can suffice to cause an uprising?

Nurali, khan of the Little Horde, wished to know the exact number of Kazaks under his authority, and he charged his sons who [578] governed the various tribes of this people with this duty. But a number of obstacles halted them from the first steps. He did not achieve his end and only managed to arouse grumbling and grave suspicions.

[66] A large part of the Kazaks who settled permanently in 1801 and 1802, under the orders of Sultan [300] Bukei, in the most favorable locations of the government of Astrakhan, crossed the Ural again in 1820 because the rumor had spread among them that it was wished to make a census of them and settle them in fixed places.

If one adds to this trait of their national character the vast expanse of the steppes occupied by the Kazak hordes and the

[301 cont.]

The Little Horde

631 619 611 At its time of origin the Little Horde was composed of the powerful Alchin descent line and of seven small tribes, which, during the [302] civil wars and reprisals (baranta (1)), were not

578 628

1. Among the Kazaks, the name baranta is given to the raids they make against each other, most often as reprisals or as a consequence of hereditary vengeances.

strong enough to resist the Alchin descent line, which was more numerous, but were combined by the famous Tiavka, khan of the Kazaks, into a single descent line which is known today as that of the Seven Tribes (Semirod). The ancient name of Alchin is still found in Khan Abulkhair's correspondence with the Russian government in the first half of the last century. This descent line was composed of two stocks, called Alimuly, that is "the sons of Alim," and Baiuly, that is, "the rich sons." Later the new subdivisions which took place in this horde caused the generic name to fall into oblivion. But the names of the two stocks, to which the name of the descent line belonged equally, survived. For this reason the Little Horde is divided today into three principal parts, namely: I. The Alimuly descent line; II. The Baiuly descent line; III. The Djetir-urug descent line, or that of the Seven Tribes (Semirod).

1. The Alimuly descent line is composed of six tribes, whose names are Kara-Sakal, Kara-Kissiek, Kitie, Dört-Kara, Chumekei, and Chikly.

II. The Baiuly descent line is composed of the following 12 tribes: Adai, Djapas or Yapas, Alacha, Baibakty, Maskar, Bershch, Tazlar, Issentemir, Cherkes, Tana, Kizyl-Kurt, and Shikhlar.

III. The Seven Tribes (Semirod) descent line is composed of tribes which are called Tabyn, Tama, Kerdery, Djagal-Baiuly,

361 Ru
181 us
636 th
177 pe

[315 cont.]

181 often as its own expense, and has used
152 every means of persuasion to induce
[634 certain individuals among them to settle
342] down, at least to provide an example.
But all these efforts have been futile.

[579 their tents to live in houses. Next let us examine the ethical rela-
627] tions of the tribes and descent lines. Vengeance carried out by
628] one individual against another, the participation of their families
578 in it, their auls, their /clan/ divisions, and sometimes their tribes,
and the perpetual reprisals which result from this, sometimes re-
[166] quire hundreds of families to move away from their dwelling
places and to withdraw much farther away, forever, in order to
evade the persecutions of their enemies.

721 It is thus that the entire Karakalpak nation, which had lived
independently under the orders of its own khans on the [316] shores
of the Syr [Darya], lost its existence as a state in the last years
of the 18th century and was forced to disperse as a consequence of
the frequent attacks of the Kazaks and the acts of vengeance that
they carried out to wipe away old injuries.

101 In 1740 a large part of the Middle Horde, with its khan,
Abul Mahmet, occupied the eastern shores of the Khobda River.
Abulkhair lived most often on the shores of the Syr [Darya] or the
Kuvan. This is why he wrote to Nepluev in Orenburg in 1742:
116 "I am with the Little Horde on the Syr [Darya], and the Middle
Horde is near you, General." Today it is the opposite. None of
the tribes of the Middle Horde are near Orenburg. Several of the
auls of the Alimuly descent line in 1821 even came to make their
winter camps on the banks of the Ilek, although they had always
578 had them on the Syr [Darya], as a result of internal dissensions,
during which their enemies were supported by the khan of Khiva.
At the same time several auls which habitually camped near the

ıssian border withdrew toward the land of Khiva. All this leads
s to the conclusion that the present way of life of the Kazaks and
e nature of the land they inhabit do not permit them to form
ermanent establishments, and that for their own advantage as

221 grass for grazing, and they rarely stay any-
361 where longer than a month. Sometimes they stay
[423] only several days. Meanwhile, however, it should be noted that according to a custom adopted once and for all, auls are not allowed to use grass for grazing around strange winter
[578] camps. When this custom is not observed it leads to quarrels, sometimes to fights, and in the past it led to cattle rustling because the offended parties in such a case had difficulty in feeding their herds in winter and attempted to avenge themselves for the damage suffered.

[462] The actual order of changing camp is as follows: the chief concern in gathering, storing and loading of the tents and property falls upon the women. The head of the household only supervises the arrangements, and the other men round up the cattle, and form herds from them, each family separately. The departure is after dark, and when everything is ready, the whole caravan (kos in Kazakh) begins to move. The housewife goes first, usually on horseback, and the other women ride after her on camels or horses, carrying the property. At this time the Kazakhs usually put on their best clothes. They place their most precious and costly things (carpets, samovars, and so on) on the top, and in general the whole procession has a festive air. Since the cattle do not all move at the same pace, the herd soon begins to separate. As a result the aul sometimes spreads out over several versts. The head of the household is usually not with the moving aul; slow movement is boring to him and he rides somewhere to the side or hunts along the way. The march is usually not longer than 20 or 25 versts and then there is a halt and rest, which in summer is quite lengthy, up to three or four hours at

527 or a sultan. Here the right to preeminance is
554 decided either by the seniority of the clan, or by the importance of the family if it is a sultan. The person who is given this position of seniority is treated with the greatest respect. This is expressed, among other ways, in the fact that during the feast the cup of meat which is brought to him contains the head of the slaughtered animal.

During these banquets the persons of honor, as a sign of special graciousness, feed a younger brother with their own hands with pieces of meat and fat, placing the food unceremoniously in the mouth of the lucky fellow considered worthy of such an honor, while he usually crawls up to them on his knees. During this time beggars and servants usually wait for the end of the banquet, standing or sitting behind the feasters, and from time to time the honored guests throw them pieces of meat and bones. Afterwards the remains of the banquet belong to this hungry brotherhood and to the women.

855 The rearing of children among the Kazakhs is crude and perfunctory. Neither father nor mother bothers about them particularly. Usually the children up to the age of 12 or 13 run about in the summer naked or practically naked, in some kind of a rag. In the winter because of of the cold they often hide among the sheep, which are allowed into the tent, and there only their half-shaven, half-shorn heads pop up among the rams and gaze with wild, sharp eyes at the
578 newly arrived visitor. Like all primitive creatures, the Kazakhs do not hesitate to use expressions ris_ng to the highest degree of cynicism when they quarrel. But the head of the family only rarely beats the other members.